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ABSTRACT
The Department of Defense is under increasing pressure to
purchase defense systems and subsystems which have been devel-
oped abroad. There are many unique issues to be considered
before making a decision to purchase a foreign developed defense
system (subsystem) . The Congress and GAO have become increas-
ingly critical of DOD's efforts in this area.
In this paper a framework and procedures for its implemen-
tation are developed to facilitate the evaluation of foreign
candidate defense systems . This framework focusses on four
major areas: (1) Changes in NATO Defense Capability, (2) Real
U.S. Costs, (3) Economic Effects, and (4) Political Implica-
tions .
The mechanics of utilizing the framework are presented
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The United States and its NATO allies are attempting to
realize a more effective and economical military alliance by
implementing a policy of Rationalization/Standardization and
Interoperability (R/S&I) regarding weapons development and
procurement efforts. As a result of this policy, an era of
previously unparalleled effort in the area of cooperative
weapons development has evolved. The resulting trade agree-
ments have resulted in a flow of technology and arms that has
given rise to the term "Two-Way Street." This is in reference
to the fact that not only is Europe buying technology and arms
from the U.S. but that the U.S. is, in turn, purchasing tech-
nology and arms from Europe.
In support of this policy, both the Congress and the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) have passed the appropriate legislation
and have made the necessary policy statements to firmly estab-
lish the fact that each takes the objectives of R/S&I seriously.
Despite all the verbiage to the contrary, however, Congress and
the DOD are not in full agreement regarding the benefits to be
gained by this policy. Nor are they in agreement in regard to
the direction or magnitude this effort should assume.
This dilemma provides the basis for the research described
in this paper. As a result of the research a model or frame-
work is developed which, when applied to selected European
systems, draws together the various considerations of the decision
process and insures that the information needs of all concerned
are addressed. The model addresses not only the defense implica-
tions of alternative equipment and the cost effectiveness mea-
sures which are accentuated in the current process, but also
addresses the impact of economics and politics as well.
Basic to this model are the assumptions that a clear and
definite need, in the form of a Required Operational Capability
(ROC) , or a Mission Element Needs Statement (MENS) , has been
approved prior to any candidate's being considered. Also, it
is assumed that the available information will improve in qual-
ity as the process of selection proceeds.
This study does not enjoy the input of members of the
European industrial community since resources and time prohib-
ited their active involvement. Additionally, time and the
limited number of MENS so far approved have not permitted a
field test of the model and implementing procedures.
B. KEY DEFINITIONS
Before proceeding any further, a few of the key definitions
that will be used throughout this paper should be addressed.
1. R/S&I
The term R/S&I refers to Rationalization/Standardiza-
tion and Inter-operability . These three terms are used to
describe an objective which is expected, once realized, to
result in a significant increase in the ability of NATO to
efficiently defend itself. To more clearly explain the terms,
each will be addressed individually.
a. Rationalization
DOD Directive 2010.6, Standardization and Inter-
operability of Weapon Systems and Equipment within the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 11 Mar 77, states that
rationalization is: "Any action that increases the effective-
ness of alliance forces through more efficient and effective
use of defense resources committed to the alliance." [8:5]
It encompasses the two sister terms as well as political and
economic issues.
b. Standardization
DOD Directive 2010.6 goes on to define standardi-
zation as :
"The process by which member nations achieve the closest
practicable cooperation among forces; the most efficient
use of research, development, and production resources;
and agree to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use
of: (1) common or compatible operational, administrative
and logistics procedures; (2) common or compatible tech-
nical procedures and criteria; (3) common, compatible or
interchangeable supplies, components, weapons or equip-
ment; and (4) common or compatible tactical doctrine with
corresponding organizational compatiblity . " [8:5-6]
c. Inter-operability
Again from DOD Directive 2010.6 one finds inter-
operability defined as: "the ability of systems, units or
forces to provide services to and accept services from other
systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged
to enable them to operate effectively together." [8:6]
2. Not Invented Here (NIH )
While NIH is not a term which will be used as part of
the model, it is important to understand its emotional
implications as they pertain to the R/S&I process. In essence,
the term refers to any aversion that exists within the military
establishment to the use of systems and weapons designed and/or
manufactured abroad. For the purpose of this study, this aver-
sion will be assumed to be of minimal concern or impact. A
recent study stated that NIH:
"...manifests itself in four major areas of concern:
foreign product technology; adequacy of foreign tech-
nology; timeliness of foreign suppliers in meeting
shipment schedules and the dependability of foreign
sources to meet continuing needs. [1:62]
The study went on to find, however, that based on experience in
the private sector, these concerns are ill founded. [1:62]
With respect to quality, the study found, "...that in most
cases, these products were equal to or better than some items
purchased domestically." [1:63] Likewise, with respect to
technology, the study found, "...that modern manufacturing pro-
cesses, particularly in Europe, were capable of producing
selected items that were superior to domestic products." [1:65]
Regarding timeliness, the study determined, "...that foreign
companies, with proper controls, could be held to the same stan-
dards required of U.S. companies." [1:65] Finally, concerning
the problem of dependability, the study discovered, "...that
foreign sources generally can be depended upon to support their
equipment adequately." [1:67]
C . BACKGROUND
In the past, as much by intuition as by design, the DOD has
chosen to observe classical location theory when selecting a
source for its weapon systems. Accordingly, it has tended to
avail itself of sources of supply that were close at hand,
namely the U.S. arms industry.
Motivated by the desire to maintain an economically vital
arms industry at home, and by the demands of strong labor organ-
izations, Congress aided in perpetuating this tendency by passing,
on March 3, 19 33, the "Buy American Act," which required that
those goods purchased for the use of our armed forces be pro-
cured from U.S. sources. When this act was passed, however, the
results of an as-yet unfought World War and the exigencies of
the ensuing "Cold War" could not be anticipated.
Following World War II and the ensuing threat posed by the
resulting power vacuum in Western Europe, and the presence of
a militarily superior Soviet Army in Eastern Europe, an initially
subtle change in U.S. weapons acquisition policies began to take
shape. The vehicle for that change was born with the signing
of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949.
The treaty was signed by the twelve original signatories
in order "...to promote stability and well-being in the North
Atlantic area" and to "...unite their efforts for collective
defense and for the preservation of peace and security." [3:302]
The particular part (or section) of the Treaty which is of
interest in light of R/S&I is Article 3 which states:
"...the parties, separately and jointly, by means of con-
tinuous and effective self help and mutual aid, will main-
tain and develop their individual and collective capacity
to resist armed attack." [3:303]
It is this article, and in particular the words, "Collective
capacity," which first states the need for reconciliation of
military requirements within the NATO alliance. This was inter-
preted to include the area of arms and equipment. In 1952, the
Temporary Council Committee determined that the interest of
NATO necessitated:
"...correlating production programs of major end items of
equipment, including aircraft, artillery, small arms, radar
and wireless sets, vehicles, ships and various types of
ammunition." [3:131]
Though initial efforts were limited, inasmuch as no master
plan was developed (a weakness that exists to this day) , numer-
ous roadblocks and pitfalls existed, such as an early version
of the "not invented here" (NIH) syndrome and a reluctance to
finance multi-national projects. Additionally, the great dis-
parity in economic and industrial efficiencies between member
countries as well as fears of breaches in security made initial
efforts less than successful. [3:131]
As long as NATO maintained a technological and economic
advantage over the Soviet Union, little impetus existed to press
the need for the "collective capacity" called for in the Treaty.
Indeed, it was sufficient for each country to develop its armed
forces in a manner consistent with its own economies and priori-
ties and with the degree of oversight exercised by the respective
legislative body. In essence, the strength of the alliance had
permitted, "...placing the economic interests of each independent
nation above the interests of a strong and effective alliance."
[4:66]
One should not think, however, that progress was not made.
In fact, standardization was achieved in the specification of
various explosives, ammunition, vehicle components, impact tests,
ballistics standards and conversion standards as well as aviation
fuels and refueling fittings. However, a great deal of this
standardization was forced by the fact that the majority of the
arms supplied to the NATO countries came from the U.S., since
the arms industries in Europe were initially in shambles. Fur-
thermore, a significant part of the funding for rebuilding Euro-
pean arms industry came in the form of grants-in-aid aimed at
developing the ability to manufacture spares for the U.S. designed
systems then in use.
This arrangement soon proved not to be inviolate, however.
Soon, the European arms industry began to supply an increasingly
larger proportion of its own arms requirements, and in turn,
began to actively develop its own export markets. Accordingly,
except in those areas requiring the most advanced technology and
large capital investment, Europe began to shun U.S. manufactured
weapons in favor of its own products.
To a certain extent, European countries began to resent the
dominance of the U.S. arms industry in NATO. As a result, NATO
now resembles a conglomeration of disparate parts rather than an
efficient and mutually supporting defensive entity. As an example
"...there are deployed among the NATO military forces
today at least 7 basic models of tanks; 23 types of com-
bat aircraft; over 100 types of tactical missile systems;
multiple guns of different caliber and a host of differ-
ent types of radars--36 in NATO's navies alone. Some guns
of the same caliber cannot fire the same ammunition; air-
craft with diverse ordnance and fuel requirements can only
rearm or refuel at certain airfields; and commanders have
experienced difficulties in communications because their
communication equipment is not compatible." [5:i]
What makes this particularly worrisome is the fact that dur-
ing this same period the Warsaw Pact, being totally dominated
by the Soviet Union, has increasingly standardized its forces
to the extent that, except for varying degrees of modernization,
each country employs arms which are totally standardized and
inter-operable with those of the other members of the alliance.
Making this situation even less agreeable is the fact that
whereas NATO formerly enjoyed a vast technological superiority
to the Warsaw Pact countries, at the present time that advan-
tage is nearly, if not certainly, eroded. As stated by Dr.
William Perry:
"...the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have focused not
on independence and consumer goods for their citizens, but
on monolithic power-building. The Soviets have been spear-
heading this effort, having increased their defense expen-
ditures at a compound rate of 3 to 4 percent per year for
nearly two decades. They have overcome a 10-to-l inferior-
ity in the central strategic balance, having now reached
essential equivalence. [4:66]
Confronted with these realities and with the resulting impe-
tus to bolster the NATO alliance, a new emphasis has been placed
on the term "collective capacity" which was initially presented
in Article 3 of the original Treaty. The form of this emphasis
closely resembles the original task, outlined by those early
committees, aimed at promoting, "...the most efficient use of
the resources of the Alliance for the equipment and support of
its forces." [3:130] This emphasis derives a special significanc
from the fact that bolstering the NATO Alliance presents an
economic burden that threatens to wreak havoc on the consumer
economies of the member nations. The U.S., no less than Europe,
is feeling the pressure of this demand and accordingly has, in
concert with its allies, embarked on a policy of R/S&I.
In 1977 Congress added the Culver-Nunn Amendment to the DOD
Appropriation Authorization Act. The amendment states in part:
"...it is the policy of the U.S. that equipment procured
for the use of personnel of the Armed Forces of the United
States stationed in Europe***should be standardized or at
least inter-operable with equipment of other members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization." [6:10]
The amendment went on to require that:
"The Secretary of Defense shall, to the maximum feasible
extent initiate and carry out procurement procedures that
provide for the acquisition of equipment which is standard-
ized or inter-operable." [6:10]
This legislation permitted the Secretary of Defense to waive
the "Buy American" Act when he deemed it in the best interest
of the national defense.
To this end, the Secretary of Defense presented a report to
Congress regarding R/S&I within NATO. He stated:
"The DOD will vigorously pursue greater compatibility of
U.S. and Allied Forces to improve their ability to operate
effectively together and, to the extent feasible, achieve
more efficient Alliance resource utilization. We will con-
tinue to emphasize rationalization/standardization and
inter-operability including, as appropriate, increased pur-
chases or license of Allied equipment." [2:3]
Despite the legislation and supporting rhetoric, Congress
has been skeptical of recent DOD attempts at R/S&I- The form of
this skepticism strikes at the very rationale for R/S&I, mainly
its value to the U.S. and NATO, and is most graphically
presented in the findings of the Special Subcommittee on NATO
Standardization, Inter-operability and Readiness. The committee
found that:
"Obviously arms cooperation is not the total answer to
NATO's problems .. .The discussion of potential savings is
mostly theoretical, however. No witness who appeared
before the subcommittee suggested there would be any imme-
diate savings as a result of arms cooperation. As of now,
it is impossible to accurately predict whether arms coopera-
tion will save or cost money, either in the near future or
in the long run. This is not surprising since there is not
even a consensus on how to interpret data on cooperative
efforts to date. For example, there is no clear agreement
as to whether the "Americanization" of the Roland Missile
System has saved or wasted defense dollars." [6:14]
The committee went on to raise the major questions that it felt
must be answered regarding R/S&I:
"What are the economic benefits to be realized, and what
costs are acceptable to achieve these benefits? What are
the military benefits of implementing this policy? The
question of what military benefits are achievable leads
to an even broader question about whether immediate mili-
tary benefit to U.S. Forces should be sacrificed for polit-
ical solidarity." [6:14]
In response, the Secretary of Defense proposed the following
criteria for measuring success in dealing with NATO's problems:
"Does it cost-effectively strengthen NATO's capability
to deter or defend against Warsaw Pact attack? Does it
enhance or weaken NATO's political solidarity?" [6:15]
Answering these questions would appear to be a very difficult
task; one that cannot be approached on the basis of some broad
reliance on the value of R/S&I. Rather, it is an effort which
will require constant review in order to accurately reflect the
priorities and realities of the time frame in which the matter
is being considered. This is true because of the need to justify





"The question of how the Congress can best provide for
all of the defense requirements of the United States has
to be answered annually and the lack of any meaningful
measure of the benefits and costs of NATO standardization
and inter-operability complicates the process." [6:15]
General Alexander Haig stated that:
"...Each of these decisions must be an anguishing and
carefully worked out judgment of its own and a general-
ized formula will get you in trouble. It depends on the
pay-off and the deficiency you are filling and how urgent
it is in the context of your broad strategic concerns .
"
[6:15]
A complication that exists with the present environment is
the fact that often, in the area of off-shore procurement, the
U.S. finds itself committed to a system or component as a con-
dition of trade-off agreements or of economic and political con-
cessions made in support of our own Foreign Military Sales Pro-
gram. For instance, one of the conditions for the sale of the
AWACS to the Federal Republic of Germany was the requirement
that the U.S. purchase, in return, "the 120mm tank gun, German
equipment and labor for installation of a new U.S. European
Telephone System, and purchase of German non-tactical vehcicles."
[6:20]
The danger of such commitments is that the U.S. may find
that it must either buy a system that, upon deeper analysis,
does not meet its needs or that it may be forced to renege on a
commitment. Neither option is particularly attractive to the
U.S. or in its best interest. Thus, it would be of great value
if there existed a means for timely and relevant screening of
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the off-set candidates prior to a commitment being made. In
addition, DOD Directives 5000.1 and 5000.2 require the considera-
ation of requirements for NATO standardization and inter-operabil-
ity during the acquisition of new equipment.
With this in mind, DOD must look for more viable approaches
than the classical cost-effectiveness one when evaluating foreign
manufactured systems. The classical approach is inadequate with
regard to the information needs of Congress. Also, it is subject
to many variables existent in the European arms industry that
were not considered when it was formulated. The total spectrum
of economics, politics, strategy and military cost effectiveness
must be considered and presented by a useful approach.
To be most effective, the approach should lend itself to
varying levels of detail as required by the environment in which
it is being applied. It should be useful to national represen-
tatives or political figures when screening candidate European
systems offered in exchange for our own sales abroad. It should
aid the Program Manager in meeting the requirements of DOD regu-
lations and instructions on standardization and inter-operability
.
Thus, it should provide a framework upon which cursory evaluation
could be made based upon the values and variables which ultimately
will be dealt with in depth. On the other hand, the same approach
or model should provide the basis for a more rigorous analysis
that accounts not only for the requirements of regulations and
quantitative objectives but additionally for the economic and
political implications of the acquisition as well. Such a model
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could satisfy many of the needs of the DSARC and the Congress
as well as the needs of the statesman. This reconciliation and
coordination by one model could increase the likelihood that the
U.S. will pursue those programs and systems that give the most
promise of being acceptable.
D . METHODOLOGY
After investigating and rejecting the feasibility of devel-
oping an empirically based model, it became apparent that a
more conceptual approach was required. This approach breaks
the problem of deciding whether or not to consider a foreign
(NATO) developed system for acquisition into four sub-problems:
(1) What is the likely effect selection of a foreign-designed
system will have on the ability of NATO to defend itself from
attack? (2) What real costs will be incurred by the U.S. as a
result of purchasing competing systems? (3) What are the eco-
nomic effects in the areas of exports/imports, offset potential,
balance of payments and employment? (4) What are the political
implications?
Based on a review of available literature, an initial frame-
work for analysis was developed. This was discussed in confer-
ence with permanent and visiting faculty members at the Naval
Postgraduate School, and present and former members of the
following organizations:

















As a result of the initial discussions several refinements
were made on the framework for analysis. These are reflected in
the model as it is described in the following section. The ten
discussions held after the model had been refined served to
validate the concept and its applicability to the acquisition




The model represents several iterations. Thus, it is one
which has evolved from a great deal of thought and research.
As such, it represents not only a methodology but a perspective
of what are the broader vital issues to be considered when eval-
uating a system or component of European manufacture or design.
The model addresses the concern raised by Congressman Frank
Horton (Rep. N.Y.) when he stated:
"In short, we must be ready to answer the political and
economic questions that can be expected when we purchase
a European weapon system rather than an American System.
We must likewise be willing to deal with the military ques-
tions that can be expected when we buy a European system
instead of a possibly superior American system." [9:3]
In this respect, the model addresses four main issue areas.
It provides a logical framework for identifying and addressing
the relevant issues that should be addressed prior to any ini-
tial statements of intent. Also, these same issue areas, when
analyzed more rigorously as better estimates become available,
provide the framework required to anticipate the information
requirements of the later stages of the DSARC process and of
the Congressional review process.
It is intended that by consistently applying this framework,
albeit with varying degrees of intensity and thoroughness, in
concert with existing regulations, one can reasonably expect
that the issues of R/S&I can be successfully resolved during the
acquisition process. In addition, it is intended that this model
will provide a degree of "objectivity" which presently is lacking
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due to the narrow scope of present procedures and to emotions
of the NIH Syndrome which now permeate the decision environment.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
It should be noted at this point that the model does not
address the determination of performance characteristics. It
assumes that these are known or have been estimated. In addi-
tion, the model addresses those items of environment which, as
has been indicated, may weigh heavily on the decision process.
Finally, the model is designed to consider each variable
exclusive of the others. That is, no variable has an element
in common with any other variable. And, in all instances, the
model presumes a present value analysis of all costs and benefits
C. THE MODEL
Exhibit 1 and the following sections present each variable
of the model in depth and explain how each is applied, whether
used during the screening process or
during the latter stages of the decision cycle. Two
hypothetical applications are described in Part III.
D. MECHANICS
At Milestone of the DSARC process a scalar value will be
assigned. Later in the acquisition cycle, monetary costs (bene-
fits) may be assigned to many of the variables.
The assignment of scalar values will require that the deci-
sion maker determine the scale to be used, i.e., one-to-five
(1-5) , one-to-ten (1-10) , or even zero-to-one-thousand (0-1000)
.
The scale chosen will depend on the degree of precision available
16
and on the confidence the decision maker has in his ability to
meaningfully assign these values. The spread between the
assigned values for competing systems for a particular variable
are of more significance than the values themselves. The scalar
values are not designed to be additive.
17
EXHIBIT 1

















V/here X-, = Effectiveness
X2 = Timeliness of availability
X-z = Aggregate defense systems vulnerability
X, = Integration at battlefield level
V/here Y
2
= Real U. S. costs
and Y
2
= f (Xc» Xg, X«> Xg, Xg, X^q)
v/here X,- = Development value/cost
Xg = Production value/cost
X7 = Force logistics value/cost
Xg Data transfer value/cost
Xq = Operational value/cost
X1Q = Royalty value/cost





X12 , X^3 )
V/here X-,-, = Value/ cost of export sales
X-,2 - Value/cost of off-sets
X-,-2 = Balance of payments value/cost
X14 = Effect on IT. S. labor force
Where Y, = Political benefits
4
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1. Y, : Jhcin^oj in IIATO Jefense Capability :
The first of four issue areas is intended, to measure
tile effect the selection of a candidate weapon system will
have on the ability of IIATO (including the U. S. ) to defend
itself from attack. The issue area is divided into four
sub-variables which together account for the major considera-
tions affecting this capability. Due to difficulties in esti-
mating these areas in monetary terms at any phase of the
acquisition process, scalar values will be used throughout
for variables X-, through X,.
a. X-, = effectiveness:
This variable is intended to estimate the
effectiveness of the system based on its ability to perform
some mission as defined by the MENS.
b. Xp = Timeliness of Availability:
This variable will be assigned a scalar value,
which represents the estimated defense capability (gain or
loss) that will be realized due to the system being avail-
able earlier or later than the time frame established by
the MENS.
c. X-z * Aggregate Defense Systems Vulnerability:
This variable is intended to estimate the change
in vulnerability in aggregate defense capability resulting
from the duplicative/non-duplicative result of adoption of
the system. For example, three somewhat duplicative systems,
such as the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA), the P-15 and
the P-16 present the enemy with a broader band of performance
19
capabilities to counter than would deployment of any one of
these systems. Thus, selection of any one or two systems
would increase aggregate defense systems vulnerability, result-
ing in a relatively low value for this variable.
d. X. = Integration at Battlefield Level:
Estimate the suitability of the candidate to the
battlefield commander, considering interface problems such as




: Real U.S. Costs
The second of the four issue areas is intended to pro-
vide the desicion maker with a basis for comparing what real
(out of pocket) costs will be incurred by the U.S. as a result
of purchasing competing systems. This issue area is sub-
divided into six sub-variables. Scalar values will be assigned
at Milestone while monetary costs possibly may be used later.
If monetary cost estimates are employed, they will be present
values
.
a. Xj. = Development Value/Cost:
This variable is aimed at estimating or evaluating
the value/cost that will be realized in the R&D community as a
result of selcting a particular candidate. If the selection
results in the potential for reallocating R&D monies or for
reducing the R&D budget, a net savings results. At Milestone
this would result in a high (favorable) value, while at Mile-
stone II, for example, a negative monetary cost (i.e., a savings)
would result.
20
o. .. = i. roduc 'cion. \/alue/Cost:
b
This variable aims at estimating program pro-
duction costs as a result of the decision to acquire one or
another candidate. It presumes that learning curves and
rates of expenditures are taicen into consideration.
c. X« = Force Logistics Value/Cost:
This variable assigns a value or a cost to the
estimated support requirement required for all units of the
candidate system. It is appropriate to consider any and
all of the items of Life Cycle Costs that fall under the
heading of Support.
d. Xg = Data Transfer Value/Cost:
During the screening process, an attempt will
be made to determine if data transfer costs will exist.
During later review (e.g., Milestone II), an attempt will
be made to determine what these costs will be.
e. Xq = Operational Value/Cost:
This variable assigns a value or a cost to the
estimated operational requirements of the candidate. It is
appropriate to consider any and all of the items of Life Cycle
Costs that fall under the heading of Operational Costs.
f. X-, = Royalty Value/Cost:
During the screening process, it is necessary
only to determine if licensing or royalty costs will be
incurred. In the later stages of the decision process,
however, it will be necessary to estimate what those costs
will be.
21
y. Y-. : Economic Effects
a. X-i -, = Export jales Value/Cost:
During the screening process, an attempt will
be made to determine if any export potential exists with each
candidate offered. During the later review process, an
attempt will be made to estimate what this potential is
in dollars. Any gain in exports will be treated as a bene-
fit (large scalar value) or negative monetary cost.
b. X12 = Off-Sets Value/Cost:
An attempt will be made to determine if the
candidate has a potential for satisfying any off-set obli-
gations of the U. 3. During the screening process, a scalar
value will be assigned accordingly. In later reviews, a
monetary estimate of the benefit of such an off-set may be
made and assigned.
c. X-,-^ = Balance of Payments Value/Cost:
An attempt will be made to assess the potential
effect on the U. 3. balance of payments deficit. A value
will be placed on this estimated impact for the screening
process, while a dollar estimate will be made upon later
review.
d. X14_
= Effect on U. S. Labor Force:
Each candidate should be evaluated in light of
the job impact its selection will have on the labor force
as a whole. In later stages, this may be evaluated in terms
of the dollar impact the decision has on the economy.
22
4 . Y . : Political Benefits
Whether using the model as a screen or as a basis for
broadening the decision process during the latter stages of the
DSARC cycle, this variable will emphasize the role that politi-
cal priorities play in the ultimate decision and selection.
In neither case will a value be assigned to the political
benefits- Rather, the realities of current priorities together
with the opinions of cognizant members of the DOD and the Armed
Services Committees will be considered.
It now remains to utilize this framework to aid in the
decision process and to supplement the processes now in use.
The following section will apply the model to both the screening
process and the later DSARC processes involved with the decision





As has been indicated, the degree of rigor which will
be applied v/hen using the model will be a function of the
magnitude and complexity of the system or program which is
under consideration. Additionally, it will reflect the
environment in which the model is applied. That is, the
model will require a great deal more research and rigor to
meet the needs of D3ARC II or III than would be the case
when being utilized as a screen at the DSAHC or I level.
To provide an example of how this would be done in each
environment, two sample systems will be evaluated and then
compared to one another. In the first instance, an example
of how the model would be applied as a screen will be
addressed, while in the second, the rigor needed to satisfy
later DSARC and Congressional requirements will be presented,
It is appropriate to remind the reader that in actual
application, the model assumes that a MENS has been accepted
which makes evaluation of the candidates a valid exercise.
It is not the function of the model to establish the need
for a system. Nor is it the function of the model to deter-
mine the performance characteristics of the candidates.
Rather, the model applies known or estimated performance
factors in determining the impact they will have on the
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given issue area and variables. \lso, it is important to
remember that each variable is exclusive with regard to the
other variables in the model in that no part of what is
being estimated by one variable is included in what is being
estimated by another.
While the U. .' . is not currently actively participating
in the evaluations presented, the possibility of such an
evaluation is not at all remote. All that is lacking to
make the following scenario a reality is the need for an
approved MENS.
B. THE BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
For the sake of discussion, assume that two systems are
being considered as candidates for a new battlefield sur-
veillance system. One of these is a satellite system of U. 3.
design and manufacture while the other, a rotary wing remotely
piloted vehicle (RPV), is of European design and is offered
for licensed co-production in the U. S.
Those tasked with screening the proposed systems for
possible development would need to perform a certain amount
of preparatory research to aid them in their contacts with
the respective contractors as well as, in the case of the
NATO ally, the host government. The depth of this research
would depend on the amount of time and information available
and on the degree of definition and precision available
from the contractors during this phase.
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It is likely that the systems would be lacking sufficient
definition to permit budget caliber estimates. Thus, it is
anticipated that the values assigned each candidate, that is,
to each variable, will be scalar in nature rather than monetary.
These values will be derived from past experience with similar
systems, expert opinion, and whenever possible, manufacturer's
data or estimates.
The values assigned will be relative in nature and will
range from a low value of one (1) to a high value of ten (10)
.
Ideally, each candidate will be evaluated on its own merit and
ability to satisfy the MENS. Once this has been done, a com-
parison of the candidates may be performed. (Obviously, a
faster, but somewhat less objective analysis may be made by pro-
ceeding to the comparison step directly.) In these analyses,






The reader will remember from the previous section that
the model consists of four main issue areas, each of which may
consist of several variables. As the following example will
demonstrate, each of these variables will be assigned an
estimated value which can be, in turn, used to compare the can-




-,: Changes in NATO Defense Capability:
X-, = Effectiveness:
A
Compare the known or estimated performance
capabilities of each system with regard
to required mission capability.
The evaluation may estimate that the
satellite rates a value of (7) while the
RPV rates a value of (8).
The RPV is marginally better than the
satellite.
P
= Timeliness of Availability:
Evaluate the estimated time to Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) of the two
candidates and estimate the effect on
defense capability benefit/loss.
Assuming that the design and production
of a satellite system may require all of
an allocated five year time frame, it may
rate a value of (5Y.
The RPV on the other hand, may require
only three years to field and be awarded
a value of (8)
.
The RPV is more attractive (better) than
the satellite in this area.
X-z = Aggregate Defense Systems Vulnerability:
Estimate the change in vulnerability of th=
aggregate defense capability resulting from
selection of the candidate.
Since the aggregate defense capability
resulting from selection of the satellite
will be very hard for the enemy to counter,
it may be assigned a high value of (10).
The aggregate defense capability resulting
from adoption of the RPV is determined to be
fairly easily countered. Thus, the RPV is
awarded a value of (4).
The satellite is better than the RPV.
...
= Integration:
Estimate the suitability of the candidate
to the battlefield commander, considering
interface problems, such as Command, Con-
trol and Communications.
The satellite is estimated to impose no
burden on existing systems. It is awarded
a value of (10)
.
It is anticipated that the RPV v/ill place
an increased interface load on existing
systems or improvements in order to obtain
the required reconnaissance information.
It is awarded a value of (3).
The satellite is superior to the RPV.
Y~: Real U. 3. Costs:
Xc = Development Value:
Estimate the value of each candidate in
relation to the resulting efficiency of
the U. S. R&D effort.
It may be estimated that developing the
satellite will require that the 3&B budget
be increased or that funds be reallocated
from current programs. A value of (5) is
awarded.
Acquisition of the RPV will require no
increase in the xR&D budget and will pro-
vide the additional benefit of permitting
current RPV and satellite efforts to be
channeled into more lucrative areas.
Thus, a value of (10) is awarded.
The RPV is better than the satellite.
X/-: Production Value:
Assign a value to each candidate with
regard to the estimated total production
program cost of each.
A significant front end investment will be
required for the satellite which will
result in funding shortfalls for other
systems or the need to significantly in-
crease the budget. A value of (3) is
awarded.
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< = i'roduction Value (cont)
o
The front end cost of the RPV is very low.
A value of (10) is awarded to the RPV
candidate.
The RPV is superior in this area.
X~ = Logistics Value:
Relative to the estimated support costs,
what is the value of each candidate?
It is estimated that support costs for
the satellite will be very low since no
on-system maintenance is required. It is
awarded a value of (9).
The RPV will require a large amount of
on-system maintenance which will result
in fairly high support costs. A value
of (3) is awarded.
The satellite is superior to the RPV.
Xg = Data Transfer Value:
Assign a value to each candidate based on
the estimated complexity of any technology
transfer efforts and the resulting cost.
The satellite will have no data transfer
cost. A maximum value of (10) is awarded.
The RPV will require significant data
transfer efforts. It is awarded a value
of (4).
The satellite is superior to the RPV.
Xq = Operational Value:
Award a value based on the estimated cost
of operating the candidate.
Operational costs for the satellite will
be confined to the cost of assigning an
additional communicator to the appropriate






= Operational Value (cont)
Operational costs for the RPV v/ill
reflect the need for numerous operators
and maintainers.
Therefore, a value of (2) is av/arded.
The satellite is superior to the RJPV.
X-iq = Royalty Value:
'/hat is the value of the candidate based
on the estimated license and royalty costs
that will be incurred?
The satellite v/ill have several sub-systems
which will be directly purchased from
Europe v/hich entail no royalty costs. A
value of (10) is av/arded.
The RPV v/ill incur royalty costs as a
result of licensed coproduction in the
U. 3. They are not significant, however.
A value of (8) is av/arded.
The satellite is marginally better than
the RPV.
Y,: Economic Effects:
X = U. S. Export Sales Value:
What is the value of the export potential
the candidate represents?
The satellite is expected to have little,
if any, export potential. A value of (1;
is awarded.
The RPV is expected to generate a large
third country export potential. A value
of (10) is awarded.
The RPV is exceptionally superior to the
satellite.
X12 = 0ff
~ sets Value -
What is the value of each candidate in
light of U. S. off-set obligations?
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X-, = Off-sets Value (cont)
The satellite will satisfy no off-set
obligations. A value of (1) is awarded.
The RPV will satisfy a large off-set
obligation. A value of (10) is awarded.
The RPV" is exceptionally superior to the
satellite.
X
-.^ = Balance of Payments Value:
What is the value of each candidate in
regard to the U. S. balance of payments?
The satellite will generate an outflow of
dollars associated with the sub-system
procurement and will generate no export
potential. The resulting deficit increase
merits a value of (4).
The RPV will generate an outflow associated
with the licensing costs. A value of (1)
is awarded.
The satellite is better than the RPV.
Xld = U. S. Labor Force Value:
What is the value of each candidate to the
U. S. labor force?
The satellite is not expected to generate
any significant increase in jobs in the
aerospace industry due to the small numbers
required and due to the existing excess
capacity in the industry. A value of (3)
is awarded.
Due to the numbers that are required, the
RPV is expected to generate an increase in
labor requirements. A value of (9) is
awarded.
The RPV is superior to the satellite.
Political Benefits:
The values assigned in regard to political
benefits are elusive and vary with the priorities
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Y".: Political Benefits (cont)
of the moment. They must be considered, how-
ever. The appropriate members of DOD and of
the Armed Services Committees should be polled.
The ''political normative override" will come
into play at this point.
2. The Comparison
It is of extreme importance that the evaluator be
aware that in making the comparison that is now warranted,
no attempt should be made to total the values assigned to the
candidate in the many variable areas. Since each issue area
and each variable impact differently on the decision because
of their relative importance, they are not additive in
nature. Any attempt to total the values will negate the
fact that a rating of "superior" in one area may well be
overshadowed by a rating of "better" in a more important
area. Rather, the evaluator should only compare the ratings
for the candidate systems by variable .
To facilitate the comparison, the following array of




























































Having examined how the model might be applied as a
screen, it now reraciins to view the model as it might be
applied at Milestone II and subsequent reviews. It is at
this point that the major effort must be applied when
using the model and that the information needs of the
reviewing bodies must be fully anticipated. Therefore, the
rigor and precision required and sought understandably will
be more substantial.
For this example, the model will be applied to evaluate
two candidates offered to meet the need for a new Anti-
submarine V/arfare (A3V/) aircraft. One will be a jet pro-
pelled replacement for the P-3C Orion airplane while the
other will be a technologically advanced airship of European
design.
The projected airplane will have a cruise speed of 425
knots, a payload of 150,000 pounds, an on-station time of
5 hours and a mission radius of 900 miles. The proposed
airship will be designed to fly 100 knots, carry a payload
of 270,000 pounds, remain on-station for up to 500 hours
and have a 2,500 mile mission radius.
It is anticipated that a great deal more definition
and estimating precision will be available at this point
than at Mileston 0. Thus, well established Life Cycle Cost
models and empirically derived Cost Estimating Relationships
(CER) will be useful to provide budget caliber estimates and
appropriate monetary values for the variables under real U.S.
costs and economic effects.
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To preclude clouding the example by using spurious
dollar values, monetary units will be assigned in each
case. The reader will recognize that the appropriate
dollar values would apply in the following example.
1. The Example
Y-, : Changes in NATO Defense Capability:
X-, = Effectiveness:
The effectiveness of the airplane compared
with the MENS results in award of a (6).
The airship is awarded an (8) in this
area.
Xp = Timeliness of Availability:
The airplane is estimated to be opera-
tional prior to the maximum allowed time
and is awarded a (9).
Due to the fact that some rather innova-
tive design changes to the classic model
are necessary, it is estimated the airship
will require all of the allotted time
resulting in an award of a (5),
X- = Aggregate Defense System Vulnerability:
The aggregate defense vulnerability re-
sulting from retention of fixed wing air-
craft is not significantly altered.
Awarded a ( 5 )
.
The airship is considered fairly vulnerable
to attack. Aggregate defense vulnerability
is increased. Awarded a (2).
X . = Integration Suitability:
Each system will be able to operate within
the existing system. Each is awarded a
(6).
T.A
Y : Real U. b. Costs:
Xc = uevelopment Costs
v/hat is the dollar impact each candidate
will have on the efficiency of the U. 3.
&UD effort?
It is estimated that the airplane will
require an increase or reallocation of
10 monetary units in the R&D budget.
The airship will require no increase in
current R&D budget. Additionally, the
experience gained would have cost 5 mone-
tary units in the U. S. R&D budget. This
is recognized as a net savings of 5 mone-
tary units. (-5)
J.c = Production Cost:
o
Estimate the program production cost of
each candidate.
It is estimated that the airplane will
have a cumulative average cost of 10 mone-
tary units per plane. This represents a
cost of 1000 monetary units.
The airship is estimated to have a cumula-
tive average cost of 11 monetary units
each for a cost of 935 monetary units for
85 airships.
X7 = Force Logistics Costs:
V/hat are the estimated support costs of
each candidate?
The present value Life Cycle Support Cost
of the airplane is estimated at 10,000
monetary units.
The airship will have an estimated Life
Cycle Support Cost estimated at 5,000
monetary units.
Xg = Data Transfer Costs:
/hat are the estimated data transfer costs?
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X = Data Transfer Costs (cont)
8
There will be no data transfer costs for
the airplane.
The airship will require a data transfer
expenditure of 20 monetary units.
;i = Operational Costs:
/•/hat are the estimated operational LCC's
for each candidate?
It is estimated that the present value
operational LCC of the airplane will be
7,000 monetary units.
The airship is estimated to have a present
value operational LCC of 4,000 monetary
units.
X10 = Royalty Costs:
What are the royalty costs associated with
each candidate?
There will be none for the airplane.
The propulsion and stabilization system of
the airship will be licensed for production
in the U. S. and will incur a royalty cost




= Effect on U. S. Export Sales:
What is the cost effect of each candidate's
export potential?
The airplane is estimated to have the
potential to generate 500 monetary units
in export credits. This represents a
savings of 500 monetary units, (-500)
The airship will likewise generate third
country sales. However, it will be in
competition with the designing country
resulting in estimated export credits of
300 monetary units. (-300)
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X12 = Effect on U. 3. Off-sets:
.That costs are associated with either
candidate's potential for satisfying
U. 3. off-set obligations?
The airplane will not satisfy any off-set
obligations.
The airship will satisfy 50 monetary units
of off-set obligations for a net savings.
(-50)
X-,^ = Effect on Balance of Payments:
What effect will each candidate have on
the U. 5. balance of payments?
There will be no net increase in the BOP
deficit due to acquiring the airplane.
The airship will generate a 15 monetary
unit increase in the BOP deficit.
X-j, = Effect on U. 3. Labor Force:
What is the monetary effect of either
candidate on the labor force?
Development of the airplane will demand
only a 10 percent increase in the use of
present production capacity for a net con-
tribution of 6 monetary units* (-6)
Development of the airship will result in
the need for an entirely unique production
capability v/hich will generate a 20 percent
increase in production capacity for a net
contribution of 10 monetary units. (-10)
Y A : Political Benefits:4
No monetary value can be placed on political
benefits. It will remain to apply the political
evaluation during the sensitivity analysis.
What would be of value at this point is an esti-
mate of what range of cost differences might
meet with indifference in the political arena.
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2. The Comparison
With the above estimates in hand, it only remains
to perform a sensitivity analysis to determine which of the
candidates is more attractive. Here again the tendency is
to sum the values in order to obtain a total cost figure
for each of the candidates. The ability to do so is some-
what clouded since the relative importance of the variables
in the aggregate is not clear. It also is not clear if the
costs or values associated with each of the issue areas are
the same in nature since in one case the cost may represent
"out of pocket" costs, v/hile in the other, it may represent
an opportunity cost. Whatever the inclination of the evalua-
tors, a great deal of caution must be exercised when summing
the costs. For this comparison, Y~ and Y^ will be summed
and Y-, and Y. will be assumed to play a weighting role in
the comparison.
Again, an array will be constructed to facilitate the
comparison. Refer to Exhibit 3.
^.HIBIT 3
jrplan: .VIRJHIP

























































Y,: The "political normative override"
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As can be seen, a basis for comparison is established.
It will be left to the reader to perform such a comparison
since the decision may vary significantly depending on the
significance pieced on each of the many variables. For
instance, it is not clear if the higher cost associated
with the airplane in area Y- is significant when viewed in
the light of the generally better rating the plane received
in Y-,. Likewise, political realities may be of such signifi-
cance that the spread of values in each variable area is not
of sufficient magnitude to change a politically motivated
choice.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND rtSCOMMrINPATIO us
A. CONCLUSIONS
The time has long since past when the U. S. can consider
itself the undisputed purveyor to the arsenals of the free
world. The realities of fiscal constraint and resource
limitations, coupled v/ith the emergence of a technically
advanced and efficient European arms industry dictate that
the U. S. must increasingly participate in, and foster, an
environment which embraces the "two-way street.
"
Likewise, those same realities necessitate an ever
growing environment of cooperation and coordination among
the NATO allies. Increasingly, these allies must strive
for a commonality of means as well as purpose if the capa-
bility of the alliance is to remain more than just a paper
tiger.
The concept of R/S&I appears to have met with a con-
census in theory, if not in practice. As is the case with
any useful theory, it is the final hurdle, implementation,
which generally proves to be the more difficult obstacle.
In the U. S. , the hurdle of implementation resists being
consistently cleared not because of any lingering sense of
nationalism, not because of a "not invented here" bias, and
not because of any serious fear of industrial competition.
Rather, it resists total acceptance because of too little
definition and too much emotion.
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Congress wants to be assured that DOD is not taking too
narrow a view of R/S&I. Of particular concern is the view that
"International arms cooperation encompasses political and eco-
nomic considerations beyond the jurisdiction of the Department
of Defense alone." [6:2] This leads to the conclusion that a
broadened evaluative model is required that encompasses the
economic and political factors in addition to those of military
effectiveness
.
For this to be accomplished, however, one must first
accept that the R/S&I environment in which the U.S. must com-
pete is exceedingly more diverse than the one DOD currently
functions in and is subject to a broadened and more elusive
set of variables . These variables must be taken into account
when making the acquisition decision.
The model developed in Part II is submitted as a point of
departure, at the very least. It attempts to lend the objec-
tivity, the focus and the broadened perspective necessary to
perform a valid analysis of competing candidates from throughout
the NATO community. By applying it in conjunction with current
evaluative procedures, it is expected that the DOD and Congress
will experience few instances of disagreement regarding the
specific systems chosen in support of the- R/S&I concept.
It is concluded that in order to avail itself of any poten-
tial benefits of the "two-way street" approach to R/S&I, the
U.S. must realize that the task is not an easy one. The DOD
will have to do its homework and will have to insure that only
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those candidates which, in addition to their military value,
offer the greatest benefit economically and politically will be
nominated for acquisition. Only then can one reasonably expect
that a consistent application and a consensus of objective
between DOD and Congress can be achieved regarding R/S&I.
To that end, the model is presented as a framework within
which to work. It is not immutable in its form, nor is it all
encompassing. It is recognized that the variables may well
change to reflect the nature and form of the different candi-
dates to which it may well be applied in the future. Nonethe-
less, the four major Issue Areas of the model should provide
the basic framework for the majority of the possible candi-
dates. Likewise, the variables presented are expected to change
more significantly with regard to their weighing than their form
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
The research resulting in the above model has allowed the
researchers to come in contact with a number of thoughtful,
dedicated individuals in the defense, business, academic and
research worlds. Based on the insight gained from these dis-
cussions, it is recommended that two additional areas lend
themselves to research with the potential for significant pay-
offs :
(1) There are cultural differences or nuances in negotiat-
ing with people from other countries. An understanding of these
factors will greatly assist Americans (whether from DOD or
defense industries) in negotiations with their foreign
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counterparts. In depth interviews with individuals experienced
in negotiating with citizens of our principle NATO trading part-
ners should lead to the development of guidelines for the use of
Americans involved in future negotiations.
(2) International co-development is a major logical step
forward under R/S&I. Several of the representatives of the
defense firms contacted during this study indicated that we are
rank amateurs in the area of international co-development. In
addition, the belief frequently was expressed that "Washington"
has imposed numerous needless burdens on international defense
co-development. Field research in this area should address both
issues with the objectives of: (1) developing guidelines for
new international co-development programs, and (2) identifying
administration obstacles and recommending changes in existing
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